fenomenologlco nellafilosofia sociale t giuridica. In that book, obviously not dedicated to Kelsen. I nonetheless referred to his theses several times. And I dealt with both the critique by Kelsen of Rudolf Smend's theory of the state and with the anti-Kelsen polemic by his ex-pupil Fritz Sander (who died a few years later). In 19 54, In the essay 'Aspetti odiemi della filosofia giuridica in Gennania', moreover. I analysed the work of two of Kelsen's followers. Felix Kanfmann and Fritz Schreier, who had endeavoured to reconcile the criticism of the Marburg school with phenomenology. N.B. My first article directly devoted to Kelsen, 'La teoria pura del diritto e i suoi critici'. appeared in the Rivista trimestrale di diritto eprocedura civile twenty years after I started out as a legal philosopher, namely in 19 54. But my 'conversion' to Kelsenlsm, to use that term again, had come years earlier. In my lectures at Padoa in 1940-41 there was a section on the step-wise construction of the legal system: the reference was to Kelsen's famous Stufenbau, which fascinated me even then. I may add that in the legal philosophy courses I gave at the University of Camerino in the second half of the 19 30s, the lesson plans were structured In three parts: the sources of law, the legal norm and the legal system. This pattern directly reflected my reading of Kelsen. In fact my 'conversion' to Kelsen coincided with the violent break with the past that came in our country's history between the second half of the 1930s and the early 1940s.That historical break corresponded to a discontinuity In my intellectual life too, both private and public.
D.Z. Your support for Kelsenlsm, then, may be seen within an overall framework of revolt against speculative philosophy, especially against idealism?
N.B. I would say so. While the failure of Fascism was becoming evident, we realized that speculative philosophy had offered us very little help In understanding what had happened in Europe and in the world during the World War. We had to start from scratch, embarking on studies of economics, law, sociology, history. Dropping speculative philosophy In favour of 'positive philosophy' -in accordance with Carlo Cattaneo's lesson -I understood that the philosophy of law could not but become part of the 'general theory of law'. Accordingly, once I had conceived of the 'general theory of law' as a formal theory I found myself very close to Kelsen and his Reine Rechtslehre. And I was impelled to defend Kelsen against his detractors, then numerous In Italy, among both sociologists, Marxists and followers of the natural law doctrine. I also broke with the idealistic features of Italian philosophy of law, which then concentrated, In the wake of Croce and Gentile, on topics like the 'place' that should be assigned to law in the moral sciences. My essays on 'La teoria pura del diritto e I suoi critici', which I cited earlier, and 'Formalismo giuridico e formalismo etlco', which appeared In the Rivista di filosofia In July 1954, put a public stamp, so to speak, on my Kelsenism, even though In fact it dated from several years earlier. I might say that Kelsen was at home, as it were, among us and had been since the 19 30s. that theoretical reflection on law within a law faculty context ought to coincide with the 'general theory of law' or, as I said at the time, with the legal philosophy 'of lawyers', not 'of philosophers'. And Kelsen's monumental work offered me just the model I needed: a rigorous 'general theory of law', systematic and of exemplary clarity, a rather rare gift even among German lawyers. It was also a very original theoretical proposal, which had nothing in common with the speculative lucubrations of Italian idealism, then very much present in the philosophy of law (incidentally, it cannot be said that this tradition of vagueness and speculative obscurity has been entirely done away with even today within our legal theory disciplines). Kelsen was the only author to offer a clear theoretical alternative. Then a few years later the figure of Herbert Hart appeared and I developed a much closer personal and Intellectual relationship with him than with Kelsen. Hart was British, but his theoretical research was closely associated with German legal culture, and was essentially a development of Kelsen's reflections. This explains why my lessons in the philosophy of law, particularly my courses in the 'general theory of law', could not help being strongly influenced by Kelsen, especially by one of his most important works, Reine Rechtslehre, which I used in its first edition from 1934. Nor should it be forgotten that I began to give courses in philosophy of law at the University of Camerino in the winter of 193 5, and thus almost at the same time as the publication of that fundamental work by Kelsen. Kelsen was, and could not help being, naturaliter the inspiration for my activity as a young lecturer in the philosophy of law (I was not yet thirty years old). Even the structure of my two Turin courses mentioned earlier reproduces a fundamental distinction put forward by Kelsen: between the theory of (individual) norms and the theory of the legal system as a structured set of norms. I need not add that the thesis I then upheld -that what identifies law is not the nature of its norms but the structure of its system -was implicit in the distinction drawn by Kelsen between the 'static' system, characteristic of ethics, and the 'dynamic' system of law. This distinction, as we know, was to become central in Hart's thought He talked of primary norms and secondary norms, including among the latter the norms on the production of law. I say this even though it is true that the central, unifying thesis of these two courses of mine, that the definition of law is to be sought not In the distinctive features of the legal norm but in those of the legal system, also has much to do with the Italian doctrine of the legal Institution. N.B. Certainly, you're right. Kelsen's closure of the legal order is a sort of reference back from final causes to the first cause, from empirical determinations to the causa sui. Thus in an essentially non-metaphysical thinker like Kelsen the 'closure' of a system through the Grundnorm is only, so to speak, a closure of convenience. It is a little like the idea of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state. The idea of sovereignty as 'power of powers' is a closure of convenience, no different from the Grundnorm conceived of as a 'norm of norms'. Nothing verifiable corresponds, nor can correspond, to these notions. N.B. Yes, I did put forward that interpretation, hi Kelsen, and let us not forget that he is a democratic and pacifist thinker, reference to the 'fundamental norm' is probably a way of removing the legal system from the arbitrariness of political power, of asserting the primacy of law and of rights and freedoms over raisons d'itat. Without neglecting the fact that at the international level law is for Kelsen associated with a fundamental value, namely peace. And it is certainly because of this, in the name of an explicitly pacifist and anti-Imperialist ideology, that he asserts the primacy of International law over the legal systems of individual nation-states. For Kelsen, as, incidentally, for Thomas Hobbes, law is the instrument for introducing peaceful relations among men and among states. For Hobbes the fundamental natural law, the 'fundamental norm' you might say, is pax querenda est. This convergence between Hobbes and Kelsen has always impressed me. It is no coincidence, probably, that after having studied Kelsen I spent a lot of time studying Hobbes' political thought For both, peace is the fundamental good that only the law can guarantee. Peace through law is in fact the title of a famous book by Kelsen. N.B. Perhaps I have never taken a sufficiently clear position on this point, which I acknowledge is both highly delicate and, I fear, irrepressibly ambiguous: the relation between law and power. In one way it is law that allocates power -lexfacit regembut In another way it is always power that institutes the legal system and guarantees Its effectiveness: rexfacit legem. And it cannot be denied that this ambiguity may also be perceived in Kelsen as a theorist of law and the state or, In any case, he does not resolve it. For Kelsen too, the uncertain relationship he sets up between the validity and effectiveness of norms means that at the vertex of the normative system lex et potestas convertuntur.
Formalism versus Anti-formalism D.Z. At this point I must inevitably ask you for some clarification regarding your 'formalism'. You yourself have often stated that you consider yourself a formalist in the legal sphere but an anti-formalist in ethics. You have frequently written and said that your legal positivism has always been a 'critical legal positivism'. What exactly does that mean to you?
N.B. When I speak of legal positivism I distinguish among three possible interpretations. First there is legal positivism as method, that is, a way of studying the law as a complex of facts, phenomena or social data and not as a system of values; a method which therefore sets at the centre of inquiry the 'formal' problem of the validity of law, not the axiological one of the justice of the contents of norms. Secondly, there is legal positivism understood as a theory: a theory of legal positivism, developed during the era of the great codifications, ran right through the nineteenth century. For this conception, from the icole de I'exegese to the German Rechtswissenschaft, law coincides perfectly with the positive order emanating from the legislative activity of the state. This is an imperativist coercivist legalist conception, which upholds the need for a literal, mechanical interpretation of written norms by the interpreters, especially judges. Finally there is a third interpretation, the one I have called the ideology of legal positivism: the idea that the law of the state deserves absolute obedience as such, a theory which may be summed up in the aphorism Geseti ist Gesetz, the law is the law. I have always rejected legal positivism in its specifically theoretical and ideological aspects, although I have accepted it from the methodological viewpoint I have accepted it in the sense that legal scientists are those who are concerned with analysis of the law in force within a definite, particular political community. Accordingly, they do not set themselves ethical or ethico-legal objectives of a universal nature, which obviously does not rule out that they can or ought to deal also with iure condendo ...
D.Z. Let me interrupt you one last time to stress that in your methodological legal positivism there is, I feel, a rather ambiguous relationship with the theory of human rights.
Though denying the possibility of a philosophical and hence universal foundation for subjective rights, you would appear to find it very difficult to give up the idea of some sort of universality of these rights.
N.B. I don't know, I don't know... You suspect that there is in me, unconsciously, some sort of 'Kantianism', an attachment to the idea that some values, like respect for human life, must be asserted in every case. But I would like to remind you that I have always regarded the idea of the universality of moral laws as highly problematic. Indeed, I have strongly supported the notion that there is no norm or moral rule or value -not even the principle oipacta sunt servanda -which, however fundamental, ought not historically be made subject to exceptions, starting with the two chief distinguishing factors: the state of emergency and self-defence. N.B. Personally I feel that what is in crisis is not so much the normativist model as legal positivism. What is in crisis is the positivist ideology of the primacy of the law of the state, the supremacy of legislation in relation to jurisdictional law or contractual law. This is so because of the poor technical quality of legislative output because of disproportionate quantities of legislation and also because of the growing complexity of social phenomena requiring regulation. And I feel that the thesis of the centrality of the judge, which has been affirmed in American legal thought for obvious historical and institutional reasons, ought to be taken into account or at least re-discussed, in a continental context. Perhaps also more attention ought to be given to the Ideas of Bruno Leoni. whom I have perhaps too readily criticized In the past Leoni, closely associated as he was with the English-speaking world and especially the conservative liberalism of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, had opposed the English-speaking tradition of the rule of law to the continental stato di diritto (or Rechtsstaat, 6tat de droit, etc On this very topic I wrote a long letter a few days ago in reply to a liberal economist. Following Leoni. this economist made a juxtaposition of law as a spontaneous, conventional phenomenon, founded essentially on contract, with legislation as the expression of the centralist power of the state, with its despotic tendencies. I have no difficulty in acknowledging that Kelsen's whole approach, in the light of which I trained as a legal theorist more than half a century ago, is in grave difficulties today, if not in downright discredit I recognize that things have changed a great deal. In addition, it should be borne in mind that Kelsen was a publicist that he came from public law: accordingly, he saw the law much more from the viewpoint of power than from that of the freedoms of the individual, of private life, of individual privacy. But even here one ought not to exaggerate by one-sidedly overthrowing the relationship between public law and private law. a distinction already present in Roman legal thought The Romans clearly distinguished between legal relationships oriented towards individual utility and those that concerned collective interests. Otherwise, we risk celebrating the victory of private particularism over the dimension of the public sphere, of surrendering without defence to the logic of the market And I fear that were that to happen, and perhaps it is already happening, what would triumph would not be the freedom of all. but the war of all against all. N.B. If I had to pin down the two 'theoretical finds', If you'll pardon the expression, that always inspired me with profound admiration for Kelsen, then I would say his hierarchical structure of the legal order, that we have already discussed, and the primacy of international law. I say that the idea of the primacy of international law Is a 'find' in the sense that this too was a very original proposal. The theoretical area of international law was then dominated by the dualist theory, namely the idea that there are two normative realms radically different from each other, represented by the state legal systems on the one side and international law on the other, the full legal nature of which tended to be called into doubt. There was also a monistic doctrine, albeit a minority one, which denied the existence of an International legal order outright, recognizing no other law than that of sovereign states. Kelsen literally inverted the traditional approach, proposing a monism that made international law the only authentic 'objective' legal order, with state legal systems forming merely a part thereof, and a subordinate part to boot, destined in the long run to dissolve along with the sovereignty of states. This proposal is in my view an extraordinary one, since it is the only one that can make international law do its essential job, namely, to organize peace. I am, as you know, convinced that as long as there is primacy not of international law but of the legal systems of the individual states, peace can never be stably assured. ''institutionalpacifism' too? N.B. There is no doubt about that And I confess I am surprised that, as you maintain, I have never explicitly written as much, or that it does not clearly transpire from my writings on the theme of war and peace. Kelsen is the jurist who not only maintains that the chief end of law is peace and not justice, but goes so far as maintaining that the law -especially international law -is the only way to guarantee a stable, universal peace. Who but Kelsen could be the emblematic founder of 'legal' or 'institutional' pacifism, as I have termed my position? And when, after criticizing other forms of pacifism, I end by proposing the idea of a pacifism that would pivot around truly supranational legal institutions -and not only international ones -I have always had in mind Kelsen's idea of the primacy of international law. I have had in mind, too, his opposition to the system of sovereign states in the name of peace and an anti-imperialist ideal. (And, I might say in parentheses, I was rather disconcerted when, in the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre, in 1960, Kelsen made a by no means minor correction on this point: he substituted the term 'collective security' for 'peace', obviously in the name of a more rigid Instrumental, anti-finalist conception of law.)
D.Z. Are you asserting, then, that Kelsen exercised direct influence over your

D.Z. It seems clear to me, then, that it was primarily, if not exclusively, Kelsen's Das Problem der Souveranitat that Inspired your 'institutional pacifism', since it is there that Kelsen, as well as theorizing the primacy of international law, unleashes a very strong attack against the sovereignty of states and against the very idea of the nation-state. This he does in the name of the (originally theological) conception of the unity of the human race as civitas maxima. It is also in the name of this classical cosmopolitan ideal -of this 'supreme ethical idea' as he writes -that Kelsen goes so far as to predict the extinction of states and the birth of a 'world or universal state' and of a planetary legal order capable of guaranteeing peace through the use of legitimated international force. Was this, then, the model that inspired what 1 have called your 'cosmopolitan pacifism'?
N.B. In a certain sense yes, I cannot deny that though I would introduce a number of clarifications and nuances in relation to your reconstruction. At any rate, let me recall what I maintained in the 1966 essay you have cited, where I dealt most extensively with the theme of peace. I distinguish three forms of pacifism: what I called 'instrumental' pacifism, which is limited to proposals for intervention regarding means, such as controls on arms production and disarmament; then pacifism with an ethlco-religious, educational or therapeutic approach, which aims to convert mankind to the virtue of peacefulness, or at least to provide moral and civic education; finally, I proposed the idea of institutional pacifism because I have gradually become convinced that the only sustainable pacifism, as it is achievable and effective in practice, is one which relies on a supranational development of the present international institutions. The (Hobbesian) argument underlying my position is very simple: just as men in the 'state of nature' first had to collectively renounce the individual use of force and then allocate it to a single power holding the monopoly of force, so too states, which today live in a 'state of nature' formed by mutual fear, must effect a similar transition. They have to make their power converge into a new, supreme organ exercising the same monopoly of force over single states that the state exercises over individuals. It is clear that, once again following Kelsen, I have very specifically adopted the model of the domestic analogy that you criticized in one of your recent books. N.B. One of the objections that might be made to your criticism of the domestic analogy Is that the formation of the great federal states, such as the United States, repeated at the level of state relations that very process of concentration of power which characterized the emergence of Europe from feudal anarchy In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These states were very much built on the domestic analogy, there's no doubt about that You might maintain that the idea of a world federal state Is a Utopia, and that cultural, economic, religious and other differences are much greater here. This is not to deny that the federal state is today a concrete institutional reality, and that taking it as a model for the organization of supranational institutions is by no means absurd In theoretical terms, something plucked out of a hat... In any case, the tendency of contemporary states to concentrate part of their power In supranational organisms is already taking place. Just think of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. This is a line of development that Kelsen himself indicated and fervently hoped for when In 1944, In Peace through Law, he proposed the setting up of an International penal jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for war crimes for which they were responsible. This is just what the Hague Tribunal is doing, even if only for the former Yugoslavia. What we are seeing, then, is a trend towards constructing the international legal system no longer as an association among states, but as something that includes as subjects of law all the citizens of all states. This too corresponds to a prediction by Kelsen, in addition to being recognized in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for which individuals are also subjects of the international legal system. A part of the power of states over their citizens is thus removed from them and handed over to supranational institutions that see to protecting fundamental rights even against the authorities of the individual states. How in practice to achieve the international protection of human rights -by means of which judicial institutions, for instance -is a very delicate question, but this is not to deny that we are slowly moving towards a position where individuals will no longer be mere citizens of an individual state, but also citizens or subjects of supranational entities or even of a federal state of worldwide dimensions. This corresponds, for me, to Kant's ideal of 'cosmopolitan law', the right of universal citizenship, on the basis of which all human beings as such are citizens of the world. To be sure, this also fits in with something that is part of the Catholic tradition. 'No one is an alien' is a splendid expression I recently heard spoken by the Pope. But this is, I believe, in fact the true ideal of law ...
D.Z. Yes, as you know, 1 maintain that one cannot take for granted the existence of a 'world society' that can be treated in any sensible way like northern European civil society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 1 do not believe that the so-called 'global civil society' can act as a basts for the political unification of the planet, repeating on a world scale the path that led to the formation of the modem European state. Moreover Kelsen himself, in
D.Z. But there are those, 1 am thinking of Serge Latouchefor Instance, who maintain that after the global victory of the market economy we are becoming increasingly foreign to each other, to the point that today we might say that 'everybody is an alien'. On the other hand, there are those who maintain that the differences among cultures and among peoples, and hence in some way their political divisions too, are a wealth that is being threatened by the 'cosmopolitan' process of Westernization of the world led by the United States superpower.
N.B. I understand, but the important thing is that there is a trend under way, and this I feel cannot be denied, which is taking us towards the fulfilment of Kant's ideal of cosmopolitan law. The ideal in my view is that the subjects of law in the world system should be individual persons, not states ...
D.Z. But if we imagine building a world political system In which there are individuals on the one hand and the powers centred in a world state on the other, with no mediation any longer through intermediate political structures, do we not risk giving rise to a sort of cosmopolitan Jacobinism? If the sovereignty of the national Leviathans is suppressed because it is held responsible for the existence of international anarchy and war, it remains difficult for me to understand why the despotic or totalitarian sovereignty of the Leviathan should not reappear, enormously strengthened, in the guise of the universal state combining within itself the totality of international power, previously diffused and dispersed in thousands of rivulets. And this Leviathan would obviously be incarnated in a restricted 'directoire' of economic and military superpowers.
N.B. I have already had occasion to say that while it is true that your 'anti-cosmopolitan' theses did not convince me at first reading -I remain an impenitent cosmopolitan -they did, all the same, cause me to reflect for a long while. This objection of yours was one of those that really made me think. Nonetheless, we have to come to understand why today, on every continent there Is a widespread tendency towards the development of supranational legal and political entities, on a regional scale. By far the most important example is the process of European unification, which is not being arrested, but is indeed expanding in territorial terms. The United States of Europe, a prospect opposed today by no political force on the Continent, marks the success of the trend you criticize, namely the trend towards overcoming the dispersion of power by concentrating it in supranational organisms.
D N.B. I wish to emphasize that my thoughts on the problem of war began in the 1960s -that is, the period of the Cold War and the balance of terror. When I defined war as an event like a natural disaster, lying outside any legal or moral valuation, I was referring essentially to nuclear conflict. I maintain that conviction. Yet there is the risk of deducing from this position the principle that in the nuclear age any type of armed conflict is illegitimate and unjust One might even draw the conclusion that a war of defence against aggression or a war of national liberation are unjust too. I do not share this conclusion, since I feel there must be a distinction between 'primary violence' and 'secondary violence', between whoever first uses military force and those who are defending themselves. Normally whoever first uses force is the aggressor, and those exercising force second are the weaker, compelled to defend themselves: the two positions cannot be legally or morally set on the same plane. This is the classic topos of aggression and resistance to aggression. I am very well aware that it is not at all easy in specific situations to determine clearly who is the aggressor and who is the victim, for instance in the case of a civil war. Yet we cannot neglect the fact that -as I maintained during the Gulf War too -if we do not establish criteria for legally and morally assessing the use of military force, we run the risk of always giving in to the bully. I usually say that if we were all conscientious objectors except one, this one could take over the world. Aggressors are very happy to find themselves facing adversaries who renounce the use of force. I am absolutely convinced of that I say it with the greatest of respect for non-violence and for absolute pacifism. Indeed, there ought to be a truly absolute pacifism, practised by all... but we are aware that that is not the way things are, and perhaps never can be. N.B. Yet one must meditate on the fact that violent people do exist... This Is why, for instance, at the domestic level we have assigned to the political system, to the state, a monopoly on the exercise of force: this has been done in order to control and reduce widespread violence, to protect citizens from the aggressions of the violent So it is hard to see why this cannot be done at the international level too, giving rise here too to forms of monopoly of the use of force, and thus legitimating recourse to military force against those who first exercise violence. It should further be added that today, at the International level, a new, very serious phenomenon is occurring: private violence is reappearing and spreading. It is almost a return to the situation of the Middle Ages. Criminal groups are engaging in clandestine trade in arms, drug trafficking and the exploitation of women and children are multiplying and growing stronger at planetary level. The Mafia, for instance, is a phenomenon that from the West has spread to Russia as well as to China. These are extremely powerful, highly armed criminal organizations that even have heavy weapons at their disposal. In the face of this phenomenon, the power of repression available to the individual states is entirely insufficient Their very sovereignty might be overthrown by the overweening power of the criminal organizations, something we have more or less seen in Albania and perhaps, too, in the war in the former Yugoslavia. It would not be overly bold to imagine that there could be completely different wars in the near future from those we have seen so far in clashes between states. These wars were at any rate tempered to some extent, subject to rules of ius in bello regarding, for instance, the treatment of prisoners, the prohibition of certain types of weapon, etc. All this might become something utterly passe\ ridiculous... N.B. It is natural for me to be completely in favour, and along the purest Kelsenian lines. Kelsen was the first in his 1944 work that I've repeatedly mentioned, to propose the setting up of this type of international court I know that there are discussions in formal terms in connection with the Hague Tribunal. There are those who maintain that this is a special court or that the United Nations Security Council was ultra vires in deciding to set it up. But I think that it was necessary to start somewhere, and that it was right to start this way. But over and above that, I am especially in favour of the fact that we are moving towards an international law whose subjects are no longer just the states, but also, and especially, individuals. This means, I repeat the achievement of a project that Kelsen, in his farsightedness and courage, was the first to conceive.
DJZ. So you think that only
